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Abstract: Behind the constitutional crisis of the European Union lies the conjuncture of 
‘authoritarian liberalism’, when politically authoritarian forms of governing emerge to protect 
the material order of economic liberalism. This constitutional conjuncture can be grasped by 
integrating into constitutional enquiry the material dynamic between democracy and capitalism, 
as recently theorised by Wolfgang Streeck. Authoritarian liberalism can then be explored across 
a much deeper and longer constitutional trajectory, from the interwar breakdown of liberal 
constitutionalism, to its post-war and post-Maastricht reconstruction, in each case represented 
by a de-democratisation of the economy. From this perspective, the recent assaults on 
democracy in the Euro-crisis appear to be a continuation of, rather than divergence from, the 
normal path of integration. Where this will end remains to be seen. Although authoritarian 
liberalism is increasingly accompanied by authoritarian illiberal responses, there has not yet 
been any definitive rupture, with the possible exception of Brexit.   
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 2 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
In the period spanning nearly a decade from the beginning of the financial crisis to 
the present, the constitutional state and state-system in Europe has been affected 
by a series of challenges to its authority and legitimacy. With regard to the 
European Union, these challenges are fundamental in that they go to the very 
existence of the project and to the values it professes to be founded on. They 
seem increasingly inter-connected to the EU and the trajectory of integration 
rather than merely external to it. For the moment, the EU remains relatively 
resilient; outside of the UK, appetite for ending the experiment mostly inhabits the 
political fringes, although even in core countries, anti-European pressures are 
mounting and Euro-sceptic parties are on the ascendency. What is clear is that the 
challenges to the current system go as much to the legitimacy of domestic regimes 
and their political authority as to the EU itself, not least from the fragmentary 
pressures on the state from below in the context of subnational claims to 
autonomy. In short, the crisis of authority is not merely of the EU but of the 
regional state system and the governing order in Europe.  
 The material conditions for this decade of multiple crises were set in place in 
the era of the Treaty of Maastricht and the geo-political reconfiguration of Europe 
that accompanied it. Maastricht established the constitutional structure of EMU, 
laid the groundwork for the Schengen regime, opened the door to differentiated 
integration and anticipated the Enlargement of Europe to the East. It also marked 
a change in the material balance of power, re-unification inaugurating the path to a 
‘German Europe’, and the end of any ‘really existing alternative’ to liberal 
capitalism unleashing a neo-liberal ideological hegemony, with not only centrists 
but erstwhile critical theorists calling an end to emancipatory projects.1  
 This process of de-politicisation reached its apogee in domestic contexts of a 
‘third way politics’ (made famous by Tony Blair’s New Labour project, but 
imitated by social democratic politicians across Europe) that offered no alternative 
to the neo-liberal paradigm, and in many cases deepened it.2 European integration 
reinforced an edifice of ‘extreme centrism’, through its institutional procedures of 
consensual law-making, constitutionalisation of the Treaty, and basic 
commitments to market liberalism.3 In the absence of any robust supranational 
                                                      
 
1 Most notably Jürgen Habermas, declaring that since 1989, ‘it has become impossible to break out of the 
universe of capitalism; the only remaining option is to civilise and tame the capitalist dynamic from 
within’ in The Crisis of the European Union: A Response (Polity Press, 2012) 106. (This is the same Habermas 
who now declares Brexit the defeat of capitalism by populism, Die Zeit, 12 July, 2016, 
http://www.zeit.de/kultur/2016-07/juergen-habermas-brexit-eu-crises-english.)  
2 This begins earlier, with Mitterrand’s climb down from a socialist programme in his first years at 
President of France under pressure of the financial markets. For analysis, see L. Panitch and S. Gindin, 
The Making of Global Capitalism (London, Verso 2012). 
3 The term ‘the extreme centre’ belongs to Tariq Ali. For discussion of Brexit as representing a crisis of 
‘extreme centrism’, see M. Wilkinson, ‘The Brexit Referendum and the Crisis of Extreme Centrism’ 
(2016) German Law Journal.   
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democracy, this left member states with politics but without policies, and the EU 
with policies but no politics.4 Or, as Streeck more recently puts it in reflecting on 
the Euro-crisis phase, ‘where there are still democratic institutions in Europe, 
there is no economic governance any more, lest the management of the economy 
is invaded by market-correcting non-capitalist interests. And where there is 
economic governance, democracy is elsewhere.’5  
 I have tried to capture the constitutional crisis of the current period as 
representing a reprise of ‘authoritarian liberalism’, revealing the politically 
authoritarian face of economic liberalism.6 This phenomenon was identified by 
Hermann Heller as characteristic of the late Weimar regime before its collapse in 
1933.7 Karl Polanyi sketched it as a more general feature of the period leading up 
to the interwar collapse of liberal democracy.8 In this conjunction, then as now, 
norms of democratic constitutionalism (especially representative democracy and 
legality) are bypassed in order to maintain economically liberal commitments to 
currency and price stability, austerity and fiscal discipline, competitiveness and the 
avoidance of moral hazard. But this inflection is not merely formal or impartial; it 
serves various class and – within the geo-political context of European integration 
- national interests.  
 It is no surprise that authoritarian liberalism is accompanied by systemic and 
anti-systemic challenges to the prevailing order, as alternatives are sought out, 
political populism returns, and authoritarian illiberalism beckons. This is most 
evident in Central and Eastern Europe, but is also represented in the growth in 
core Europe of Eurosceptic parties such as the Front Nationale and the Alternative 
für Deutschland. These movements and counter-movements are uneven in Europe, 
splintered and fragmented across the region, and yet commonalities can be 
identified.  
 The purpose of this chapter is to analyse these common themes and explore 
the deeper roots of ‘authoritarian liberalism’, conceptually and historically. It will 
be argued that although heightened in critical moments, the phenomenon of 
authoritarian liberalism corresponds to a more basic tension in the constitutional 
state between the forces of capitalism and democracy. This material dynamic has 
recently been theorised by Wolfgang Streeck, but, as yet, is missing from 
constitutional enquiry.9 Introducing it gives us a clearer perspective on the 
                                                      
4 See P. Mair, Ruling the Void (London, Verso, 2013).   
5 W. Streeck, ‘Heller, Schmitt and the Euro’ (2015) European Law Journal 361 – 370. 
6 M. Wilkinson, ‘The Specter of Authoritarian Liberalism: Reflections on the Constitutional Crisis of the 
European Union’ (2013) 14 German Law Journal 527 - 560; ‘Authoritarian Liberalism in the European 
Constitutional Imagination: Second Time as Farce?’ (2015) 21:3 European Law Journal 313 - 339; ‘The 
Reconstitution of Postwar Europe: Liberal Excesses, Democratic Deficiencies’ in M. Dowdle and M. 
Wilkinson (eds.) Constitutionalism Beyond Liberalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017) 38 – 79 
7 Hermann Heller, ‘Autoritärer Liberalismus’, Die Neue Rundschau 44 (1933): 289-298, (H. Heller (trans 
S. Paulson), ‘Authoritarian Liberalism?’ European Law Journal 21 (2015): 295-301). 
8 See Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time (Boston: Beacon 
Press, 2001 (1944)) 
9 See W. Streeck, ‘The Crises of Democratic Capitalism’ (2011) 71 New Left Review 5 – 29; W. Streeck, 
Buying Time: The Delayed Crisis of Democratic Capitalism (London: Verso, 2013). But see M. Goldoni and M. 
Wilkinson, ‘The Material Constitution’ (2018) Modern Law Review, forthcoming.  
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trajectory of European integration: from the very beginning of the post-war 
project through to the Euro-crisis phase, constitutional development hinges on 
this material dynamic.  
 The argument will proceed as follows. I will first outline the features of the 
Euro-crisis regime that characterise it as both ‘authoritarian and liberal’, and 
suggest this represents a deepening of rather than divergence from the normal 
path of integration (Part 2). This confluence of authoritarianism and liberalism 
sounds curious because, taking liberalism for political liberalism, political and 
constitutional theory generally elides the material and conflictual dynamic between 
capitalism and democracy (Part 3). To explore this further requires a historical 
turn, taking first the inter-war breakdown of liberal constitutionalism in Europe 
(Part 4) and then the post-war and post-Maastricht reconstruction, based on an 
economic constitutionalism, which was influenced, I speculate, by a profound 
misreckoning – concern for the democratic threat to liberalism subsumes the 
liberal threat to democracy (Part 5). This reconstruction lays the ground for the 
present moment, a critical but as yet inconclusive phase when authoritarian 
liberalism assumes more active forms in an attempt to maintain the material order 
(Part 6). Although in some ways reminiscent of the inter-war breakdown of liberal 
democracy, the outcome remains uncertain: contestation has increased but without 
definitive rupture, with the possible exception of Brexit.  
 
 
II. AUTHORITARIAN LIBERALISM 
 
The term ‘authoritarian liberalism’ captures two symptoms of the constitutional 
development of Europe. First, there is an authoritarian aspect to EU, and 
especially Eurozone, governance, represented by a twofold process of de-
democratisation and de-legalisation.10 This refers to the bypassing of parliamentary 
authority and parliamentary debate as well as the violating or circumventing of 
normal guarantees associated with the rule of law, including the protection of 
social rights. This dual development has been captured by terms such as ‘executive 
managerialism’ and ‘emergency Europe’.11  
 But second, and underemphasised in those accounts, which focus on 
mutations in the formal exercise of authority, is the material nature of this 
authoritarianism and its historical pedigree: its aim at the maintenance of a regime 
                                                      
10 C. Kilpatrick, ‘On the Rule of Law and Economic Emergency: The Degradation of Basic Legal Values 
in Europe’s Bailouts’ (2015) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 35, No. 2, pp. 325–53. Kilpatrick now 
offers the term liminal legality, which nicely captures the legal grey area of much of the Eurozone 
conditionality, see ‘The EU and its Sovereign Debt Programmes: the Challenges of Liminal Legality’ 
(2017) Current Legal Problems.   
11 See C. Joerges, ‘A Crisis of Executive Managerialism in the EU: No Alternative?’ in Trubek, D.M., de 
Búrca, G., Kilpatrick, C. and Scott, J. (eds) Critical Legal Perspectives on Global Governance: Liber amicorum 
David M Trubek (Oxford: Hart Publishing); J. White, ‘Emergency Europe’ (2015) Political Studies, Vol. 63, 
No. 2, pp. 300–18.  
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of economic liberalism represents a deepening of rather than diversion from the 
normal path of integration. It is, in that respect, a ‘conservative revolution’.  
 The substantive conditions imposed through the Euro-regime, by member 
states of the Euro-group as well as the ‘Troika’ of institutions (IMF, European 
Central Bank and European Commission), are neo-liberal ‘austerity’ measures (e.g. 
privatisation, liberalisation, labour market reforms, regressive tax increases). This 
demands extraordinary government intervention in society, dismantling social 
contracts and disrupting existing social relations. It has also been backed by class 
and country specific injections of central bank liquidity, particularly through the 
OMT programme.12 Conditionality (hypothetically in the case of the ECB’s bond-
buying under OMT) is justified on the basis of the need to return to or 
approximate ‘market conditions’ of competitive economic practices, in order to 
avoid the moral hazard of a rescue that might incentivise further government 
imprudence and avoid or defer neo-liberal structural reform.13  
 Although these measures of conditionality impose very specific, intrusive, and 
debilitating constraints on debtor countries, they are consistent with and even a 
continuation of the liberal economic bias of the European constitution. This has 
evolved unevenly over the last few decades but it affects the EU as a whole, not 
only the Eurozone; and it affects debtor as well as creditor countries. 14 This is an 
important point because its puts the allegedly exceptional nature of the measures 
in fuller context. So, although care has to be taken to distinguish particular 
institutional mutations in the governance of economic and monetary union, 
especially the new powers and authority of the Euro-group and the ECB, it is 
important to note that the neo-liberal bias of the Euro-crisis response is 
symptomatic of broader trends in EU economic constitutionalism if not 
necessarily demanded with any precision in the letter of the Treaty.15  
 The hollowing out of social democracy through the Euro-crisis in favour of 
technocratic market-making and enforced market-rationality is thus a feature of 
much longer trends. Concerns about the EU’s democratic deficit long predate the 
financial crisis of 2008; perhaps the most well-known article on the democratic 
deficit was published in 2006, Hix and Follesdal depicting in painstaking detail the 
centrist free-market bias of the ordinary legislative procedure, and without even 
any discussion of the constraints imposed as a result of Economic and Monetary 
Union.16 In response to German Court’s Maastricht ruling, Jürgen Habermas 
noted in 1995 that the democratic deficit was already ‘expanding day by day 
                                                      
12 See, especially, M. Blyth, Austerity: History of a Dangerous Idea (OUP, 2013) 
13 On the OMT programme, see M. Wilkinson, ‘‘The Euro is irreversible, or is it? On OMT, Austerity, 
and the Threat of ‘Grexit’’ (2015) 16 German Law Journal 1049 – 1072  
14 See F. Scharpf, ‘The asymmetry of European Integration, or, why the EU cannot be a social market 
economy’ (2010) 8 Socio-Economic Review 211 – 250. 
15 For an argument that ‘downturn austerity’ is better understood as an ideological prescription rather 
than a legal obligation within the European constitutional framework, see C. Kaupa, ‘Has Downturn 
Austerity Really Been Constitutionalised in Europe? On the Ideological Dimension of Such a Claim’ 
(2017) 44:1 Journal of Law and Society 32 – 55.  
16 See S. Hix and A. Follesdal, ‘Why there is a democratic deficit in the EU: A response to Majone and 
Moravscik’ (2006) 44 JCMS 533 – 62. 
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because the economic and social dynamics even within the existing institutional 
framework perpetuate the erosion of national powers through European law’.17 In 
reality, concerns amongst critical and Marxist scholars about the economically 
liberal bias of European integration and its impact on social democracy can be 
traced back to before the Single European Act and earlier (even during the so-
called trentes glorieuses).18  
 Although forces of authoritarian rule intensify once re-politicisation is 
threatened, the dynamic of de-democratisation is identifiable right from the start 
of post-war European reconstruction.19 The difference through the Euro-crisis has 
been the increase in the degree of popular resistance as ‘anti-austerity’ social 
movements have been harnessed across the continent by political parties and in 
the case of Greece, obtained the reins of government. But if the era of permissive 
consensus is decisively over, there has not (as yet) been a definitive rupture of re-
democratisation - either at the supranational or national level, with the possible 
exception of Brexit.20  
 If democracy was never the guiding thread of European integration, law, 
however, did play a central role, and right from the foundational stages.21 The 
transition from ‘integration through law’ to ‘integration through fear’, as Weiler 
characterised crisis-era Europe, therefore appears significant.22 The harnessing of 
fear can be captured in the new identification of a Schmittian enemy, not external 
and physical, but rather internal and ideological. According to Donald Tusk, the 
notion that there could be any alternative to austerity is a dangerous illusion.23 
Tusk associates resistance to austerity as somehow ‘anti-German’, and speaks 
approvingly of ordoliberalism. The notional enemy is anyone who calls into 
question this new ‘common sense’, those ‘bad Europeans’ who disregard the 
economic stability criteria.24 
 A domestic electorate may of course accept the idea that ‘there is no 
alternative’ to neo-liberal structural reforms. But now that idea is imposed as a 
constitutional (even supra-constitutional) constraint, achieving ideological 
                                                      
17 J. Habermas, ‘Remarks on Dieter Grimm’s ‘Does Europe Need a Constitution’’ (1995) 1 European Law 
Journal, 303 – 307. 
18 For an earlier discussion of the link between European integration and capitalist development see P. 
Cocks, ‘Towards a Marxist Theory of European Integration’ (1980) 34 International Organization 1 - 40 
19 See Wilkinson, note 3 above. 
20 Representing, according to Habermas, the victory of populism (if not democracy) over capitalism, see 
note 1 above. Because of the UK’s distinct relationship with Europe, leaving the EU does not represent 
the same likelihood of rupture as would a core country, such as France, Germany or Italy, leaving. See 
further, Wilkinson, ‘The Brexit Referendum’, above.  
21 See e.g. A. Cohen, ‘Constitutionalism without Constitution: Transnational Elites Between Mobilisation 
and Legal Expertise in the Making of a Constitution For Europe (1940’s-1960’s)’ (2007) 32 Law and Social 
Enquiry 109 and A. Vauchez, ‘The Transnational Politics of Judicialisation: Van Gend en Loos and the 
Making of the EU Polity’ (2010) 16 European Law Journal 1. 
22 See Joseph H. H. Weiler, ‘Editorial: Integration Through Fear’, European Journal of International Law 23 
(2012): 1- 5 
23 See ‘The Donald Tusk Interview: Annotated Transcript’, Financial Times, July 16th 2015. 
24 See Udo di Fabio, ‘Karlsruhe Makes a Referral’, 15 (2014) German Law Journal 107 – 110. 
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hegemony despite the fact that it still seems explicitly partisan in a political-
economic and a geo-political sense - the crisis has emerged with clear winners and 
losers, between nations as well as between classes within nations.25  
 But the novelty of the move away from legality can also be overstated. Thus 
the attempt to create a loose structure of public discipline within EMU, the 
‘Stability and Growth Pact’ - setting deficit and debt levels that were violated 
almost immediately by France and Germany - was under-enforced before the crisis 
by the European Council and the European Court of Justice.26 This fact was given 
relatively little attention at the time; in the era of the Open Method of Co-
Ordination, soft law, new governance and other softer forms of de-legalisation 
were celebrated by many as sensible departure from a Community method of law-
making that was too centralised and ‘one-size fits all’, unable to accommodate the 
constitutional diversity within the Union.27  
  It is important to grasp the way in which heightened authoritarianism is both 
transformative yet also conservative of the existing constitutional order. To be 
sure, the Euro-regime can be said to have mutated from a nominally rule-based 
structure accompanied by market discipline to a discretionary order reinforced by 
bureaucratic power.28 And this is not a temporary suspension of normality, in 
response to a situation with a clearly demarcated end-point, or with the limits of a 
sunset clause. It is open-ended and future-oriented. But it has a conservative aim. The 
aim of this mutation, substantively, is not to change but to maintain the existing 
material constitution of Europe and its fundamental market-driven objectives.  
 This is not to say there is nothing new about neo-liberalism, as a specific 
regime of accumulation, for example, so dependent as it is on financialisation of 
the economy for its resource accumulation and distribution.29 The point is rather 
to pursue a more basic conceptual connection between authoritarianism and 
liberalism in the dynamic of constitutional change. The provenance of this 
conjunction in earlier phases in European history, specifically in the inter-war 
period of late-Weimar, suggests a longer and deeper linkage. And it is to this that 
we now turn. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                      
25 See Blyth, above.  
26 Case C-27/04 Commission v Council 
27 For discussion of the relation between new governance, legality and democracy, see M. Wilkinson, 
‘Three Conceptions of Law: Towards a Jurisprudence of Democratic Experimentalism’ (2010) 2 Wisconsin 
Law Review 672 
28 For a detailed exposition, see M. Ionnanidis, ‘Europe’s New Transformations: How the EU Economic 
Constitution Changed During the Crisis’ (2017) CMLR 1237 - 1282 
29 For a useful recent account see e.g. B. Fine and A. Saad-Filho, ‘Thirteen things you need to know 
about neoliberalism’ (2017) 43:4-5 Critical Sociology 685 - 706 
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III. POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC LIBERALISM OR DEMOCRACY 
AND CAPITALISM? 
 
If the confluence of authoritarianism and liberalism appears incongruous, this may 
be because the constitutional imagination is captured by political rather than 
economic liberalism. During ideological battles of the cold war period, liberalism 
was twinned with democracy (in Western capitalism), and opposed to authoritarian 
socialism (in Soviet Communism).30 This was buttressed by the ‘end of history’ 
thesis famously announced by Fukuyama, liberal democracy presented as the 
culmination of historical progress, a kind of Hegelian terminus après la lettre. 
Under the influence of Rawls and Habermas, liberalism is paired with democracy 
and even a certain progressive (in the sense of egalitarian) political-economic 
position. Both theorists located their work within the context of a really existing 
liberal democracy and support broadly social democratic goals.  
 Neither Rawls nor Habermas, however, offers the prospect of any alternative 
to capitalism as a matter of political economy.31 Nor, more problematically, do 
they offer any analysis of capitalism, of the threat that capitalism poses to the 
democratic order. Radical democrats and critical theorists have thus long criticised 
Habermasian and Rawlsian political liberalism (and not only Hayekian economic 
liberalism) for being insufficiently attuned to the question of power, whether it is 
the significance of cultural power in the struggles for ideological hegemony or the 
capacity for economic power to translate into or effect political domination.32 
Ideology as well as capital can threaten the ‘empty place of power’ on which the 
autonomy of the political depends.33 In this view, liberalism (as well as related 
traditions of neo-republicanism) neglects the danger of domination arising in, but 
not limiting itself to, the economic and social sphere.34 It takes for granted the 
existence of a vibrant democratic culture, underestimates its fragility and evades 
the threats arising to it from within the capitalist economy. The logic of 
individualism, marketisation, competition and the profit motive can and do lead to 
                                                      
30 For discussion, see e.g. P. Wagner, ‘The Democratic Crisis of Capitalism: Reflections on Political and 
Economic Modernity in Europe’ LEQS Paper No 41/2011 
31 J. Rawls, Political Liberalism (Columbia University Press, 1993); J. Habermas, Between Facts and Norms: 
Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy (MIT Press, 1995).  
32 See e.g. S. Wolin, ‘The Liberal/Democratic Divide: On Rawls’ Political Liberalism’ (1996) 24 Political 
Theory 97 – 119; C. Mouffe, ‘Deliberative Democracy or Agonistic Pluralism’ (1999) 66:3 Social Research 
745 – 758.  
33 See further, M. Wilkinson, ‘Public Law and the Autonomy of the Political: A Material Critique’, in M. 
Wilkinson and M. Dowdle (eds.) Questioning the Foundations of Public Law (Hart Publishing, forthcoming). 
34 Rawls’ own framework (unlike Hayek’s version) may be thought to be compatible with social justice or 
even demand significant redistribution of wealth. But there remains insufficient attention given to the 
historical record of liberal societies in meeting its egalitarian claims (and Rawls’s own egalitarian 
intuitions). See J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971); cf. Gerry 
Cohen, Rescuing Justice and Equality (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2008).  
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the erosion of the solidarity and community that democracy needs in order to 
thrive.35 
 Constitutional theorists also evade the question of economic power in a 
capitalist society, tending to devote their attention to the counter-majoritarian 
dilemma, typically evaluating the legitimacy of constitutional review of legislation 
to protect basic civil liberties.36 There is less attention to the impact of market 
freedoms on equal liberties, of justifications of the decision-making framework of 
the central bank, or of constitutionally restricting the micro- and macro-economic 
policy choices of the government, even on their impact on commitments such as 
equality of opportunity. Celebrations of the metaphorical ‘marketplace of ideas’ 
displace concerns over the actual marketplace of goods, capital, services and 
persons, and more broadly over the effects of commodification and marketisation 
on social relations, short of exploring marginal instances of market immorality, 
things ‘money can’t buy’.37 The dynamic of political-economic development is 
missed because dominant strands of legal and constitutional theory adopts a 
normativist method of abstract analysis, depending, say, on a fictional state of 
nature in the social contract tradition, a momentary legal system in the tradition of 
legal positivism or a moralised commitment to the rule of law in the anti-positivist 
constitutionalist tradition.38  
 To be sure, economic liberalism has a more explicitly checkered history in its 
relationship with democracy. Hayek’s distrust not only of social justice, but also of 
democracy and his flirting with political authoritarianism, is well documented.39 
Identification of the pairing of political authoritarianism and economic liberalism 
is thus not at all new or unique to the recent Euro-crisis. The notion has been used 
in the context of Southeast Asian capitalism and Latin America to refer to 
politically authoritarian and even autocratic and dictatorial measures to implement 
so called ‘free market economics’. 40 This type of pairing is sometimes referred to 
as ‘authoritarian neo-liberalism’, associated with a turn from a relatively consensual 
neo-liberalism of the ‘third way’ to the more coercive type that emerged during the 
recent financial crisis.41  
 But there is a more general conceptual point to be made. The relative 
autonomy of the economic in a capitalist state – operating according to a logic of 
                                                      
35 See K. Polanyi, The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time (Boston: Beacon 
Press, 2001 (1944)). From the different context of the US, see J. Dewey, The Public and Its Problems (1926). 
36 See e.g. L. Alexander (ed.) Constitutionalism: Philosophical Foundations (Cambridge University Press, 1998).  
37 See M. Sandel, What Money Can’t Buy: The Moral Limits of Markets (Allen Lane, 2012) 
38 Rawls’ own later concern (when he moves from the general theory of justice to its more particular 
expression in Political Liberalism) is with the stability of the political conception of justice in the face of the 
challenge of multiculturalism and the pluralism of comprehensive doctrines rather than in the face of the 
challenges of capitalism, specifically its structural tendencies towards inequality, on which, see T. Piketty, 
Capital in the 21st Century (Harvard University Press, 2013) 
39 Cf. W. Scheuerman, ‘The Unholy Alliance of Carl Schmitt and Friedrich Hayek’ (1997) 4 Constellations 
172. 
40 See e.g. K. Jayasuriya, ‘Globalisation, Sovereignty and the Rule of Law: From Political to Economic 
Constitutionalism’, Constellations 8 (2001): 442 
41 On ‘authoritarian neoliberalism’ see I. Bruff, ‘The Rise of Authoritarian Neoliberalism’ (2014) 26:1 
Rethinking Marxism 113 – 129.  
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de-politicisation (naturalisation) of inequality, commodification of social relations, 
and competitive erosion of the bonds of solidarity – affects the legitimacy of the 
political domain of democracy and of the relationship between rulers and ruled. Liberal 
constitutional theory, and constitutional theory more generally, evades this 
dynamic, taking free market capitalism as a given. It simply does not provide the 
tools to deal with the pathologies and contradictions of capitalism, the tension 
between public goods and private interests, and the structural inequalities of 
power embedded in the capitalist state. These are not free-floating but constituted 
by and constitutive of legal and political relations.  
 To get a better grip on this, we must turn to work that offers a 
conceptualisation of these dynamics, moving towards a more ‘situational’ 
approach, a mix of historical, comparative, critical, political-economic, and geo-
political analysis.42 The division between political and economic domains then 
looks more blurred and inter-related, reflecting a material tension between 
democracy and capitalism as real political and social forces. Wolfgang Streeck has 
popularised this tension and it is a useful heuristic for conceptualising 
constitutional change.43  
 In the post-war period, Streeck recounts how the capitalist state is 
transformed from a ‘tax state’ during the trentes gloriueses, to a ‘debt state’ in the 
neo-liberal era beginning in the 1970’s, to a ‘consolidation state’ in the last decade 
of austerity-driven political economics, under particular pressure of the single 
currency.44 But the modern state also develops as a democratic state; its 
constitutional authority depends at root on some connection to ‘we, the people’. 
‘The people’ here represents the rhetorical and symbolic force of popular 
sovereignty. This represents the relative autonomy of the political realm, not only 
from theological power, as in classic accounts of modern secularisation, but also 
from economic power. It is not merely a presupposition, or a worldview. It is a 
fragile and ongoing material process, attained, if at all, by social struggle against the 
fusion of political and economic power and class rule (which does not end with 
feudalism). Its narrative includes worker’s movements, women’s movements, anti-
colonial movements, and other struggles for equality and recognition.45 The state 
can be represented as a tension between democracy and capitalism, community 
and coercion, solidarity and individualism (represented by the figures of the 
Statsvolk and the Marktvolk, as Streeck puts it).46 
 In this more sociologically rich account, the state can be said to represent the 
unity of difference between the political and economic; it is no mere inert 
                                                      
42 For a preliminary sketch of this approach in constitutional theory, see M. Goldoni and M. Wilkinson, 
‘The Material Constitution’ (Modern Law Review, forthcoming).  
43 See W. Streeck, ‘The Crises of Democratic Capitalism’ (2011) 71 New Left Review 5 – 29.  
44 W. Streeck, Buying Time: The Delayed Crisis of Democratic Capitalism (London: Verso, 2013) 
45 These are struggle for what Castoriadis calls ‘effective autonomy’, see Philosophy, Politics, Autonomy: 
Essays in Political Philosophy tr. D. Ames (OUP, 1991). 
46 See Streeck, above.  
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container, or abstract idea of reason, but reflects stages of democratic and 
capitalist development, associated, for example, with the extension of the franchise 
as well as the expansion of the market.47 In critical periods, when capitalism and 
democracy come into explicit, direct conflict, both in terms of interests and ideas, 
the state is increasingly ‘seen’ as a representation of these tensions in political 
economy and in some cases as a partial actor in their resolution. The reason we 
can talk here about the state and not just about temporary elected government is 
that all the institutions of the state (‘the ideological and repressive state apparatus’ 
as Althusser calls it) reinforce and recalibrate the relationship between democracy 
and capitalism – the military, police, judiciary, central banks, as well as cultural and 
media institutions.48 For those states which are members of the Eurozone, we can 
add to the governing apparatus the five unelected presidents, of the Commission, 
Council, ECB, Euro-group and European Parliament. This repressive and 
ideological apparatus of the state-system in Europe not only bypasses democratic 
accountability; it does not even have a strong democratic representative body as 
supplementary or corrective force.  
 Just as capitalism and inequality may threaten the democratic state, 
democratic material struggles for political and social equality may appear as a 
potential threat to the capitalist state. Democratic movements may threaten a basic 
structural re-differentiation of the political and the economic with political-
democratic control over the economy (in the case of democratic socialism). In 
such a context, in order to maintain the status quo, the ideological and repressive 
apparatus of the capitalist state and state-system proffers a more active form of 
authoritarianism. To capture the development of these material constitutional 
dynamics in Europe, we can now present a brief diachronic overview. 
 
 
IV. INTER-WAR EUROPE: A MISRECKONING? 
 
In conjunctural periods, the tension between the democratic state and the 
capitalist state is heightened, entailing deep-seated constitutional crisis. A 
particularly significant moment for grappling with the structure and dynamic of 
European integration is the inter-war period, marking the end of the jus publicum 
Europeaum of the ‘long nineteenth century’ (from the French Revolution to the 
First World War). In late Weimar Germany, the democratic capitalist state reached 
breaking point, not only due to external factors, but because of the growing threat 
of a class conscious and politically emancipated proletariat which threatened the 
differentiation of the political and the economic established and protected by the 
Constitution itself.49 The reaction of the governing elite to this threat was 
                                                      
47 See e.g. B. Jessop, The State: Past, Present, Future (Polity Press, 2016). 
48 See L. Althusser, On the Reproduction of Capitalism: Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses (Verso, 2014 
(1971))  
49 The Weimar constitution promised to protect economic liberalism as well as the social state, posing a 
dilemma well understood by its architect, Hugo Preuss. See H. Preuss, ‘The Significance of the 
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ultimately a combination of authoritarianism and economic liberalism, as identified 
by Social Democrat and constitutional theorist, Hermann Heller.50    
 The term ‘authoritarian liberalism’ was thus used by Heller to denigrate the 
attempts of the German state in alliance with big business in the period between 
1930 and 1933 to keep economic liberalism going at all costs, maintaining the 
differentiation of the political and the economic by violating it, intervening in the 
economy in favour of capitalist interests.51 Heller’s target with the label was not 
only the centrist Cabinets of Chancellor Brüning that governed Germany before 
the Nazi party took power, but also the constitutional theorist who had advised 
them, Carl Schmitt.52 Schmitt had recommended a strong state in order to keep 
the free market economy going against the threat of democratic socialism and 
experiments of economic democracy, encapsulated in his address to the 
Langnamverein in 1932, ‘strong state, free economy’.53 
 The Brüning cabinets bypassed parliamentary democracy, using presidential 
decrees under cover of emergency, in order to impose austerity and defend the 
social relations of capitalism and economic liberalism – competition, the profit 
motive, accumulation, private property, and social inequality.54 The aim of this 
formation was the frustration of any democratic solidarity, in order to maintain the 
capitalist form of the economy, in a critical period of deflation, high 
unemployment and political turbulence. For authoritarian liberals, the fear in these 
conditions was that democracy might turn towards socialism (a fear heightened by 
the earlier Bolshevik victory in the Soviet Union).55 
 This pattern of authoritarian liberal response and reaction to economic crisis 
was far from unique to late Weimar – right across the globe countries tried to 
maintain the political-economic demands of the Gold Standard, fiercely resisting 
social democratic programmes, until, eventually but unevenly, countries 
abandoned Gold, and market liberalism, leading, for example, to Welfarism in 
                                                                                                                                         
Democratic Republic for the Idea of Social Justice’ in A. Jacobson and B. Schlink (eds.) Weimar: A 
Jurisprudence of Crisis (University of California Press, 2000). 
50 Hermann Heller, ‘Autoritärer Liberalismus’, Die Neue Rundschau 44 (1933): 289-298, (Hermann 
Heller (trans S. Paulson), ‘Authoritarian Liberalism?’ European Law Journal 21 (2015): 295-301). 
51 ibid 
52 This approach to social democracy wasn’t restricted to the German authoritarian liberals. Austrian 
liberal von Mises noted that despite the dangers of fascism and its makeshift nature, it will be forever 
acclaimed for saving the continent from socialism and the attendant dangers to private property, 
approving Engelbert Dolfuss’s crushing of labour and social democracy in Austria in the 1930’s. For 
further discussion, see Alexander Somek, ‘Austrian Constitutional Doctrine 1933 to 1938’, in Christian 
Joerges and Navraj Singh-Ghaleigh (eds.) Darker Legacies of Law in Europe 361, 362 (Hart Publishing, 
2003). In 1935, the cabinet of Laval in France undertakes authoritarian measures to save the Franc under 
enabling laws that bypass ordinary parliamentary debate, see Loewenstein, ‘Autocracy versus Democracy 
in Contemporary Europe’ (1935) The American Political Science Review, 571 – 593. 
53 See Carl Schmitt, ‘Strong State, Sound Economy’, reprinted in Cristi, above.  
54 For a full account, see E. Kolb, The Weimar Republic 2nd ed. (Routledge, 2005) 116 - 135 
55 Cf. R. Cristi, Carl Schmitt and Authoritarian Liberalism: Strong State, Free Economy (University of Wales 
Press, 1998).  
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Britain and the New Deal in the US.56 According to Karl Polanyi, the more 
fiercely countries resisted social democracy through authoritarian government in 
the name of economic liberalism and sound finances, the stronger and fiercer the 
eventual backlash would be (the ‘double movement’). Authoritarian government 
hollowed out democracy, ultimately weakening its ability to respond to the Fascist 
threat when it arrived. It was, in other words, authoritarian liberalism that 
prepared the ground for Fascism.57  
 Heller’s own earlier considered view was that conditions of extreme socio-
economic inequality were incompatible with the survival of a constitutional 
democracy, because democracy requires a certain degree of social homogeneity, or 
at least the prospect of such, to sustain political legitimacy.58 He had warned 
presciently in 1928 that the relative tranquillity in the Federal Republic would be 
short-lasting because social homogeneity was ‘lacking to an extent unmatched in 
previous eras.’59 Capitalism, in other words, was a threat to the constitutional 
order.  
 Yet the message taken by mainstream constitutional theory in response to this 
extraordinary double movement and the breakdown of liberal democracy it 
entailed in Germany (and elsewhere) would be quite different from the one Heller 
and Polanyi had conveyed. It was not the threat that economic liberalism (or 
capitalism) posed to democracy that resonated in the liberal constitutional 
imagination but the threat that democracy posed to liberalism. This came to 
prominence through the work of another constitutional theorist of the period, 
who had emigrated to the US, but became closely involved in post-war German 
reconstruction, Karl Loewenstein. Loewenstein, writing in 1935, thought that 
liberal democracy needed to be more ‘militant’ in the fight against Fascism (and, if 
to a lesser extent, also against Communism).60 The structures of the Weimar 
republic should have been more flexible in order for it to defend itself, by 
suspending constitutional rights, banning political parties, preventing extremist 
groups and associations. Lowenstein, describing the opportunism of the Fascist 
opponents of the constitution, urged liberal democracy to pre-empt them, take the 
fight to its enemies, if necessary to ‘fight fire with fire’, echoing Carl Schmitt’s own 
call for robust defence of the Weimar constitution, by dictat and decree.61  
                                                      
56 See Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time (Boston: Beacon 
Press, 2001 (1944)). 
57 It was reaction to the ‘deadlock of the market system’ that precipitated the ‘conjoint disintegration’ of 
the political and economic system across the globe. Although reactions were similar only in discarding 
laissez-faire principles, where liberals obstructed social and economic reforms that might involve 
planning, regulation or control, ‘the victory of fascism was made practically unavoidable’. Rejecting purely 
local or historical explanations for the situation that gave birth to Fascism, ‘in reality’, Polanyi insists, the 
part it played was determined by one factor: ‘the condition of the market system’, ibid, at 250 - 265.  
58 H. Heller ‘Political Democracy and Social Homogeneity’ in A. Jacobson and B. Schlink (eds) Weimar: A 
Jurisprudence of Crisis (Berkeley, University of California Press, 2000). 
59 ibid, 262 
60 See K. Loewenstein, ‘Militant Democracy and Fundamental Rights Part 1’, The American Political 
Science Review 3 (1937): 417 – 432 and ‘Autocracy versus Democracy in Contemporary Europe Part 1’, 
The American Political Science Review 29 (1935): 571 – 593. 
61 Ibid, 432 
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 In the aftermath of World War II, mainstream political and constitutional 
theory became preoccupied with liberal constitutional defence, neglecting the 
sociological examination of the power structures that could formally and 
informally undermine democracy in a capitalist state. The German example of 
entrenching strong constitutional guarantees became increasingly influential and 
widespread (however misleading the conventional narrative of the dignified 
reaction to Nazism).62 Constitutional lawyers, and those tasked with designing 
legal and political institutions, were set to offering justifications for various 
institutional arrangements – whether domestic, international or supranational - 
that would constrain majoritarianism, with the rationale (or pretext) of preventing 
democratic backsliding or avoiding democratic irrationality. Independent 
technocratic institutions such as constitutional courts, commissions, and central 
banks became the norm, and were gradually engrained in the liberal constitutional 
imagination. European integration was an intrinsic part of this post-war 
settlement, representing the construction of a militant democracy ‘writ large’.  
 But as Jan-Werner Müller has recounted, ‘restrained democracy’ is a more 
accurate representation of this phenomenon than the inappositely named ‘militant 
democracy’.63 If anything, it was liberalism that was to be militantly protected, 
albeit in the name of democratic consolidation.64 This militancy was driven more 
by concerns to keep the wheels of economic liberalism revolving than to defend 
political liberalism, still less to promote strong democracy. 
 In constitutional enquiry, the focus undoubtedly was on the dangers of strong 
(unfettered) democracy, rather than, as Heller and Polanyi had warned, of 
unfettered capitalism and its tendency towards socio-economic inequality. If in 
political practice, the excesses of capitalism as much as democracy were tempered 
in the trentes glorieueses, through the building of the welfare state and various forms 
of corporatism and social democracy, this did not capture the attention of 
constitutional scholars, lawyers and constitution-builders. The seminal texts of 
liberal political and constitutional theory were preoccupied with resolving the 
counter-majoritarian dilemma through various devices of justification for 
constraints on the democratically determined will of the majority, both 
institutionally (constitutional review) and ideologically (as in the Rawlsian device of 
‘reasonableness’).65 The fragility of the constitution in the absence of 
constitutional review, and even legal positivism’s relativising of the question of 
legitimacy, is blamed by constitutional theorists and legal philosophers for 
Weimar’s collapse.66 Capitalism passes under the radar.  
                                                      
62 See M. Hailbronner, Tradition and Transformations: The Rise of German Constitutionalism (OUP, 2015). 
63 See Jan-Werner Müller, Contesting Democracy: Political Ideas in 20th Century Europe (Yale University Press, 
2011) 
64 ibid 
65 See Rawls, Political Liberalism, above.  
66 See Lon Fuller, ‘Positivism and Fidelity to Law – A Reply to Professor Hart’, Harvard Law Review 71 
(1958): 630 and Müller, Contesting Democracy, above, 129. Cf. F. Neumann, Behemoth: The Structure and 
Practice of National Socialism 1933-1944 (Ivan Dee, Chicago, 2009 (1942)).  
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 Mainstream constitutional theory thus leads away from any critical 
engagement with political economy. European integration itself – to the extent it is 
given any attention by constitutional scholars - is seen as an aspect of the broader 
project of restrained democracy, rather than a further stage in the reconstitution of 
the relation between politics and economics in the process of democratic capitalist 
development. Its creation of an internal market is seen tamely and benignly as 
designed merely to ensure peace and prosperity for all after half of century of war 
and destruction. Heller’s and Polanyi’s lessons and the democratic struggles for 
equality at their heart could then be forgotten, particularly as post-war growth 
masked the underlying issue of socio-economic inequality. Might this prove to be 
a misreckoning of calamitous proportions? 
 
 
V. ECONOMIC CONSTITUTIONALISM IN POST-WAR EUROPE 
 
What is clear is that the post-war constitutional imagination in Europe was not 
characterised by any vision of a vibrant democratic state. It was encapsulated in 
the story of West German post-war constitutional development: ‘we are (afraid of) 
the people’.67 Reaction to this fear entailed a new vision not only of the governing 
function (in particular the technocratic functioning of government) but of the 
governing relationship, the relation between state and society, specifically of the 
nature and limits of the right to rule over the economy. In other words, this is a 
vision of de-democratisation both of the constituent and of the constituted 
powers, of sovereignty and of government. It lays out a new vision of political 
society, of the individual as a market participant rather than a political citizen.  
 This vision was presaged in the work of the ordo-liberals, whose founding 
meeting in Freiberg coincided with Schmitt’s address to the Langnamsverein, ‘strong 
state, sound economy’.68 Sharing Schmitt’s vehement anti-communism, obsession 
with order, distrust of economic democracy, and belief in a strong state, they 
nevertheless presented unfettered capitalism (and not only democracy) as a 
challenge to the competition-based market society.69 Carl Joachim Friedrich 
identifies the ideological and constitutional significance of this ‘new liberalism’ as 
early as 1955. He notes how in Germany it signals a fundamental re-ordering of 
the basic ideas underpinning constitutional theory.70 As Friedrich understood, and 
                                                      
67 See C Möllers, ‘We are (afraid of) the People: Constituent Power in German Constitutional Thought’, 
in M Loughlin and N Walker (eds) The Paradox of Constitutionalism. The UK may be an exception to this, 
along with the sustained democracies of the Nordic countries.  
68 On the link between Schmitt and the ordoliberals, and the significant of both for the Euro, see W. 
Bonefeld, ‘Authoritarian Liberalism: From Schmitt via Ordoliberalism to the Euro’ (2017) 43(4) Critical 
Sociology. 
69 Although it was already Franz Neumann who had identified the threat of organised capitalism to the 
rule of law in the 1920’s. See F. Neumann, ‘On the Preconditions and the Legal Concept of an Economic 
Constitution’, in O. Kirchheimer and F. Neumann (eds.) Social Democracy and the Rule of Law tr. L. Tanner 
and K. Tribe (London, Allen and Unwin, 1987). See further, W. Scheuermann (ed.), The Rule of Law Under 
Siege (University of California Press, 1996) 
70 C J Friedrich, ‘The Political Thought of Neo-liberalism’, American Political Science Review 49 (1955). 
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as Foucault would later explore in his lectures on neo-liberal governmentality in 
1979, the decisive theoretical turn triggered by German ordoliberalism had been to 
replace constituent power (or popular sovereignty) with individual economic 
freedom — a freedom to participate in the market — as the legitimating device for 
the whole constitutional order.71 It is not only a question of delegating power to 
technocratic agencies to avoid temporary democratic impulses, but a basic elision 
or denial of political freedom. This reversed the original meaning of the economic 
constitution, which for Franz Neumann had meant democratic control of the 
economy.72 Instead, the constitution itself becomes sovereign, emblematically in 
post-war Germany with the idea of an inviolable ‘eternity clause’ in the Grundgesetz. 
 For the ordo-liberals, the new economic constitutionalism, based on formal 
equality, individual economic rights and competition, was intended to achieve the 
complete abolition of class as well as national conflicts from the political domain.73 
The class-conscious democratic struggles of the inter-war period would be 
repressed in order to secure political and economic stability, considered threatened 
by the democratic forces that the inter-war period had unleashed. The new civil 
religion for the post-war order would be fiscal prudence, efficiency and 
competition, the model of the German economic miracle. Democracy would be 
restrained not (only) for fear of its violating civil or political rights but out of 
concern for its impact on economic stability.74 The strong state would protect the 
market economy, and disarm any democratic (or capitalist) threat to it. 
 Although it was far from straightforwardly applied (in practice softened by 
the Social Market economy and aspects of corporatism), this reconfiguration of 
the constitutional imagination would become ideologically ascendant, first in 
Germany and then elsewhere, not least through its influence on the process of 
European constitutionalisation. The self-understanding of constitutional actors in 
Europe (in particular the ECJ and the European Commission) would be 
increasingly conditioned by ideologies and interests that correspond to economic 
rationality and the logic of market competition.75 These trends become more acute 
in time and of course extend far beyond the EU.76  
 With the Treaty of Maastricht, the differentiation between politics and 
economics is taken to a new stage in the constitution of Economic and Monetary 
Union (EMU), establishing a division between supranational monetary policy and 
national fiscal autonomy. EMU is based on the twin pillars of (a) the separation of 
                                                      
71 Friedrich, ibid; Michel Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics — Lectures at the College de France 1978–1979 (New 
York, Palgrave MacMillan, 2008) 
72 See Neumann, above. 
73 See E V Bonn, Standard Texts on Social Market Economy: Two Centuries of Discussion (ed. Horst Friedrich 
Wunsche) tr. Derek Rutter (Stuttgart, Gustav Fisher Verlag, 1982) ix.  
74 See J. W. Müller, Contesting Democracy: Political Ideas in Twentieth Century Thought (Princeton University 
Press, 2012) 
75 See, e.g., E. J. Mestmäcker, ‘European Touchstones of Dominion and Law’ (2007) The Ordo Yearbook of 
Economic and Social Order 4. 
76 See Kanishka Jayasuriya, ‘Globalisation, Sovereignty and the Rule of Law: From Political to Economic 
Constitutionalism’, Constellations 8 (2001): 442.  
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monetary policy and fiscal authority and (b) the avoidance of moral hazard. In this 
configuration, a Member State’s ability to spend and repay its existing debts would 
be based on its own ability to raise resources and, - increasingly in the era of the 
‘debt state’ (and not least due to tax arbitrage in a world where capital moves 
relatively freely)-, this was increasingly undertaken through financial borrowing.77  
 The new stage of EMU must thus be understood in the broader context of 
neo-liberal globalisation of the 1980s, and the global turn to financialisation of the 
economy.78 This incorporated a loosening of capital controls, with the free 
movement of capital eventually becoming a fundamental legal and even 
constitutional right in the EU. But with its commitment to a de-politicised 
monetary policy based exclusively on price stability; and an independent but 
limited European Central Bank [ECB] with restricted monetary tools but without 
the guidance of any supranational economic policy capable of dealing with uneven 
development, socio-economic heterogeneity, or exogenous fiscal shocks, the 
Maastricht Treaty attempted to supranationalise ordo-liberal principles designed 
for domestic constitutional consumption.79   
 Maastricht would also signal a reversal of the previous, functional logic that 
economic integration would prompt political integration, and that politicisation 
would then force elites to engage mass publics in European matters, precipitating 
a process of Euro-democratisation.80 On the contrary, it removed an important 
lever of power from the political pillars of the Member States, but without 
reconstructing it at the supranational political level or establishing any plans to do 
so. And the new currency – a ‘currency without a state’ – was not only 
democratically unaccountable (which would hardly have differentiated it from 
national variants); it also lacked the social and political bonds of community to 
sustain it, offering a symbol of the new ‘economic Messianism’ of the era to 
follow.81 To reprise Streeck’s heuristic, it seemed a decisive victory for capitalism 
over democracy, just as commentators were proclaiming the end of history.  
 
 
VI. EURO-CRISIS: AN INCONCLUSIVE CONJUNCTURE? 
 
The post-war liberal constitutional imagination, though far from democratic, is 
more passively than actively authoritarian. It is technocratic, institutional, and 
juridical in form. In substance it is economically liberal, dedicated to expanding 
markets, pursuing free trade and spreading economic rationality. Politically, it is 
                                                      
77 See Streeck, above. 
78 See e.g. A. Menendez, ‘The Existential Crisis of the European Union’ German Law Journal 14 (2013): 
453 - 526 
79 See K. Tuori and K. Tuori, The Eurocrisis: A Constitutional Analysis (CUP, 2012). 
80 See Gary Marks and Lisbet Hooghe, ‘A Postfunctionalist Theory of European Integration: From 
Permissive Consensus to Constraining Dissensus’ British Journal of Political Science 39 (2009): 1-23, at 5.  
81 See Michael A. Wilkinson, ‘Economic Messianism and Constitutional Power in a German Europe: All 
Courts are Equal but Some Courts are More Equal Than Others’ (2014) LSE, Law, Society and Economy 
Working Papers, 26/2014, available here: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2522919 
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moderate, extreme only in the centrism it espouses and the technocratic and 
managerial ethos it embodies. Democracy is restrained but not yet extinguished.  
 But this hollowing out of democracy presages the more active 
authoritarianism to come. Although democracy had never been a key component 
of the post-war construct, since Maastricht, it would be systematically over-ridden, 
and not only in parliaments but in popular referenda.82 And when the Euro-crisis 
hits, liberal centrism struggles to hold, becoming subject to increasing political 
contestation, sometimes from the margins but sometimes from positions of 
governmental power. Having lost faith in normal institutional routes, the 
apparatus of the state (and European state system) increasingly resorts to cajoling 
and coercing, undermining even its own moderate checks and balances of 
constitutional accountability in an attempt to maintain order. Since the democratic 
support for liberal centrism was always thin, it can only compensate in other ways, 
presenting those who contest it as irrational, unreasonable or un-European. Fear 
becomes its method in a more overt manner. If its success was apparent in the 
Greek crisis, its limits may have been revealed through the recent Brexit 
referendum.  
 To be sure, the Euro-crisis suggests that the material order of democratic 
capitalism in the European state-system is complex. The interests of capital are not 
always unified or aligned. They may diverge, marked by contests between Capitals 
as much as between capitalism and democracy. Authoritarian liberalism thus now 
needs to capture not only de-democratisation and de-legalisation in combination 
with the aim of a substantively liberal economic order, but the hegemonic relations 
between Capitals in a new ‘German Europe’, where every country is urged to be 
more like Germany despite the impossibility of such a demand.83  
 But this suggests that the constitutional crisis is not primarily about a conflict 
between emergency politics and the normal rules of the game. These have been 
relatively easily bent or circumvented when necessary. They are rather surface 
indicators of a deeper crisis of the material constitution. The ‘rules’ of the 
economic liberalism established by EMU (ordo-liberal in content) – e.g. no central 
bank financing, no bail-out of countries in financial difficulty, the avoidance of 
moral hazard, emphasis on price stability - come into conflict with the imperative 
to maintain the symbol of economic integration, the single currency (e.g. the euro 
is ‘irreversible’, ‘if the Euro fails, Europe fails’). In turn, they both come into 
conflict with the democratic and social movements against austerity, and in the 
case of Greece this was pushed (nearly) to the limit with the election of an anti-
austerity but pro-European government. Democracy and the rule of law, including 
the protection of social rights, are also nominally protected in the EU Treaties and 
its charter of fundamental rights, it must be recalled. There is, in other words, a 
                                                      
82 The most conspicuous warning sign was surely the Dutch and French rejection of the EU 
Constitutional Treaty in 2005, which was followed by its repackaging in the Lisbon Treaty. 
83 See Helen Thompson, ‘Austerity as Ideology: The Bait and Switch of the Banking Crisis’ (2013) 11 
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clash of fundamental political objectives: ordoliberalism, European integration, 
and democratic self-government.  
 Democratically legitimate rescue would require a transnational solidarity that 
is proscribed by ordoliberalism and cannot simply emerge through a functional 
spill-over effect. The institutional channels for it to be expressed do not exist. The 
result is rescue by the back-door, in super-technocratic fashion, as the ECB and 
the powerful members of the Euro-group take centre stage. The irresistible force 
of neo-functionalism then meets the immovable object of ordoliberalism and the 
German hegemony that it represents. This is not only an order of rules, but also 
an order of interests, predominantly those of a German political class for whom 
export-oriented policy is a raison d’état.84   
 The circle is squared by permitting rescue, not as an act of democratic 
solidarity, but through a ‘grey area’ of Union law, and with strict conditionality 
attached.85 In this way the narrative of moral hazard is switched from the risky 
behaviour of private creditors to the profligacy of public debtors – the greatest 
‘bait and switch’ in history, as Mark Blyth calls it.86 This permits a moralisation of 
the debt, and a (misleading) metaphor to take hold of the imagination, that of the 
frugal Swabian household, which saves before it spends. Fiscal indiscipline is 
avoided in substance, because states have to pursue the austerity programmes (the 
‘strict conditionality’) that are said would be demanded were they still subject to 
the financial markets. States – and the banks they are indebted to - are rescued 
enough to avoid immediate default, but without the debt restructuring that would 
be necessary to escape future dependency. The Eurozone thus develops in a neo-
colonial manner, along the lines of a core-periphery relationship between ‘creditor’ 
and ‘debtor’ nations. Germany becomes the ‘reluctant hegemon’, and the Greek 
people are ‘punished’ for electing a left-wing government that dared to oppose the 
austerity agenda of the Troika and powerful members of the Euro-group, only to 
capitulate to the ‘TINA’ narrative (‘There Is No Alternative’, to neo-liberal 
structural reform).87 The domestic clash between capitalism and democracy is 
displaced into a neo-colonial regime of integration; but it is democracy that pays 
the price.  
 Neo-functional rescue and ordo-liberal discipline can theoretically be 
maintained for the moment in a very tense and delicate balance. The long-term 
cost to the normative values of democracy, solidarity, social rights, and legality, 
however, has yet to be calculated. Political equality has rarely looked so illusory, as 
relations between debtor and creditor countries came to resemble conditions of 
‘unconditional surrender’.88  
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88 See F. Scharpf, ‘After the Crash: A Perspective on Multi-Level European Democracy’ (2015) 21 
European Law Journal 393 
                         5/2018 
 
 20 
 
VII. CONCLUSION 
 
Considered in the longue durée of the battle between economic liberalism and 
social democracy, Maastricht has been described as having put a decisive end to 
the European civil war between right and left that took place across the ‘short 
twentieth century’. It signalled the triumph of economic liberalism. The victory of 
capitalism itself was even declared complete. As Etienne Balibar frames it, 
reflecting on the (re-) birth of the EU at the Treaty of Maastricht, what is 
extraordinary is the explicit and detailed setting of its liberal political-economic 
goals into rigid constitutional guarantees: 
 ‘The EU in its constitutive moment (Maastricht) was endowed with a quasi-
constitution… where, for the first time in this part of the world… a principle of 
political economy deriving from a specific ideological discourse (namely neo-
liberal deregulation and unrestricted competition, believed to produce ‘optimal 
allocation of resources’ and spontaneously ‘just’ redistribution) was presented as 
the sovereign rule which all member states ought to implement in their national 
policies under close surveillance of the federal (or quasi-federal) organs of the 
Union…’89  
 If the argument of this chapter is accepted, however, this battle, or at least its 
preliminary stages, may have already long been lost. Once politics is reduced to a 
single political-economic logic, and the possibility of genuine renewal comes down 
to the possibility of exercising the constituent power, the autonomy of the political 
is reduced to a bare formality or the prospect of a revolutionary rupture. This 
resettlement occurs right at the beginning of the project of integration, and is 
cemented at Maastricht, rather than overturned.  
 In theory and practice, post-war constituent power is (temporarily) absorbed 
into a new regime of constituted power, based on constitutional rights, protected 
by constitutional courts, and managed by other technocratic institutions. But this 
also signifies a cultural and material shift, captured in the fear of political freedom, 
so emblematic of the German case but also affecting countries with a limited 
experience of democratic self-government. Issues of appropriation, distribution 
and production are increasingly taken out of the public political sphere of 
contestation, and determined by market logic, or the technocratic bodies who are 
supposed to replicate it. De-democratisation is a more appropriate term for this 
process that de-politicisation, given that these were highly politicised changes. And 
to capture constitutional change is to capture not only formal channelling but also 
constitutional framing, the way political debate is to be organised, and what its 
                                                      
89 E. Balibar, ‘The Rise and Fall of the European Union: Temporalities and Teleologies’ (2014) 
Constellations 202 – 212.  
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limits are.90 So the process of de-democratisation can effectively be 
constitutionalised not only through institutional means but also through political 
ideology, such as in the ‘TINA’ refrain.  
 If the constitutional implications of neo-liberal political economy are 
underscored by the reconstitution of Europe right from the beginning of the post-
war period, the current conjuncture has thrown this settlement into doubt, but not 
yet into oblivion. It has been strongly contested, but there has been no definitive 
rupture, with the possible exception of Brexit.91 If the capitulation of Greece 
suggests authoritarian liberalism may survive, developments elsewhere, as right-
wing Eurosceptic parties surge in popularity, suggests that the authoritarian liberal 
suppression of the democratic voice may, once again, tend not only to the victory 
of capitalism, but also to the resurgence of reactionary forms of authoritarian 
illiberalism. Whether any reprisal of the inter-war breakdown of liberal democracy 
will more closely resemble tragedy or farce remains to be seen.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                      
90 As Gavin Anderson puts it, ‘constitutional discourse is always more than the rules it generates or 
legitimates..., setting the parameters not just for how politics is contested, but what is deemed politically 
contestable’. See G. Anderson, in S Gill, New Constitutionalism and World Order (Cambridge, CUP, 2015) 
283, quoting Emilios Christodoulidis. 
91 The UK is one of the few places in Europe to have avoided the ‘Pasokification’ (virtual annihilation) of 
the traditional centre left party, the UK Labour party under Jeremy Corbyn performing extraordinarily 
well in comparison to its sister parties. It is therefore a possibility that the UK’s departure from the status 
quo of EU membership might, ironically given its advanced neoliberal trajectory, lead not to a right-wing 
authoritarian illiberalism, but to a turn toward democratic socialism.  
